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MYSPACE-ING IS NOT A CRIME: WHY
BREACHING TERMS OF SERVICE AGREEMENTS
SHOULD NOT IMPLICATE THE COMPUTER
FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT
Written February 2, 2009 *
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario: you are the typical American parent
with a teenage daughter. She uses social networking sites' like MySpace
2
and Facebook 3 to stay connected with her friends, send messages, and even
meet new people online.4 You do your best to keep track of her online
activity, and you make sure that she is not communicating with anyone
without your approval. One day, your daughter receives a message from a
cute boy on MySpace, and she asks you to let her message him back and
become his online friend. After looking over the message, you approve the
friendship, and your daughter excitedly begins a new online relationship.
Though your daughter and her new friend seem to be getting along well,
one day this boy begins sending mean and degrading messages to her,
seemingly without justification. The nature of these messages hurts your
• This comment was written prior to the decision of Judge George Wu to overturn the conviction
of Lori Drew; Judge Wu handed down his opinion on August 28, 2009. All arguments and
analysis were constructed with no knowledge of the court's ultimate decision. A Postscript is
included at the end of this Comment to address Judge Wu's ruling and evaluate its effect on the
case and the future of attempts to combat cyberbullying. See infra Part VI.
1. Social networking sites are websites that allow their users to connect with other users of
the service to send messages, meet new people, and share thoughts and ideas in one location. See
Definition of: Social Networking Site, PCMAG.COM,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia-term/0,2542,t-social+networking+site&i=55316,00.asp
(last visited Apr. 11, 2009).
2. MySpace: A Place for Friends, http://www.myspace.com (last visited Dec. 13, 2008).
3. Welcome to Facebook, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
4. See About Us - MySpace.com,
http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=misc.aboutus (last visited Mar. 13, 2009); see
also Facebook is on Facebook,
http://www.facebook.com/facebook?ref=pf#/facebook?v-info&viewas=3417891 (last visited
Mar. 13, 2009).
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daughter deeply and causes her to become so distraught that she retreats to
her room.
Under normal circumstances, the situation may have ended there.
Your daughter might cry for a while, but eventually her sadness would
dissipate, and she would move on. Conversely, if she were particularly
vulnerable because of severe depression and previous suicidal thoughts,
this situation might be enough to push her over the edge. Imagine that your
daughter took her life because of what someone said to her online.
Imagine, further, that the individual responsible for the messages knew of
her fragile emotional state. Finally, imagine what it would be like to know
that the person responsible for causing your daughter to commit suicide
was her friend's mother-a neighbor that she had known her entire life.
Would you not want the justice system to use any means necessary to
punish this woman for what she did to your daughter?
Unfortunately, this is more than just a hypothetical situation.5 In
2006, a Missouri woman named Lori Drew created a MySpace profile
under the name "Josh Evans." 6 Using the profile, Ms. Drew, along with
her daughter and an employee, sent messages back and forth with a 13-
year-old girl named Megan Meier.7 After receiving hurtful comments from
"Josh," Megan Meier tragically hung herself in her closet.8 In the time
following this appalling incident, significant public outcry forced the
federal government to find some way to punish Lori Drew for her conduct.
This outcry led the US Attorney's office to bring charges under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 19849 (CFAA), 10 and to Lori Drew's
eventual conviction. 1
While many applauded the government's tenacity in finding a way to
enact some sort of justice on Lori Drew, the implications of the verdict
reach far beyond this isolated case. 12 No one doubts that Lori Drew
deserves to face serious consequences for her reprehensible behavior, but
5. See Kim Zetter, Lori Drew Indicted in MySpace Suicide Case, WIRED, May 15, 2008,
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/05/lori-drew-indic.html (describing the case of Lori
Drew, who engaged in an online hoax on a teenage girl who later committed suicide).
6. Steve Pokin, MySpace Hoax Co-creator Says Drew Wrote Some Messages, ST. CHARLES
J., Apr. 3, 2008, http://stcharlesjournal.stltoday.com/articles/2008/04/12/news/sj2tn20080403-
0404stc-meier0.iil.txt.
7. Id.
8. Steve Pokin, A Real Person, A Real Death, ST. PETERS J., Nov. 10, 2007, at Al.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
10. Zetter, supra note 5.
11. Traci Tamura, Guilty Verdicts in Case of MySpace User's Suicide, CNN.COM, Nov. 26,
2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/11/26/intemet.suicide/index.html.
12. See infra Part IV.
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because of the means used to punish her, the government may have turned
many other individuals into federal criminals. 13
The average American spends about thirty hours per month online; 
14
there are approximately 130 million MySpace profiles 15 as well as over
175 million Facebook users. 16 The Terms of Service (TOS) agreements of
these websites establish under what conditions a user can access the sites. 
17
As Lori Drew's conviction rests on her violation of the MySpace TOS
agreement, any user who fails to meet the requirements of the agreement
could face the same charges.' 8 Even though Lori Drew should have to
answer for what she did to Megan Meier, the government must strike a
balance between everyone's individual freedom and the need to bring one
person to justice.
This comment discusses the apparent disconnect between the desire to
punish Lori Drew and the need to protect the rights of all Americans. It
also examines the government's inappropriate usage of the CFAA to
penalize Lori Drew for her actions and offers suggestions for a better
approach to preventing this type of incident in the future. Section II
provides a background of social networking, Megan Meier, and the CFAA.
Section III illustrates the statutory, judicial, and constitutional grounds for
not extending the CFAA to criminalize violations of websites' TOS
agreements. Section IV then examines the reasons-such as the current
laws applicable to cyberbullying and the difficulty in updating these
statutes-why the government has attempted to punish Lori Drew with the
CFAA.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Unique Nature of Social Networking Sites
Social networking sites have no analogue to traditional methods of
personal interaction. The ability to instantaneously connect with millions
13. See, e.g., Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation, et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendant, at 4, United States v. Drew, No. 08-00582 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2008) [hereinafter EFF
Brief].
14. Natalie Paris, Americans Spend Most Time on the Internet, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK, May 9,
2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1940196/Americans-spend-most-time-on-the-
internet.html.
15. Jessi Hempel, How Facebook is Taking Over Our Lives, FORTUNE, Feb. 17, 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/02/16/technology/hempel-facebook.fortune/index.htm.
16. Id.
17. See infra Part II.C.
18. See infra Part III.B.
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of individuals around the world can be both a blessing and a curse.19
According to a recent study, fifty five percent of all teens use social
networking sites like MySpace and Facebook. 20 The increased use has led
to a rise in what has been dubbed "cyberbullying.""
Social networking sites allow their users to communicate with each
other in various ways. MySpace, for example, allows its members to send
personal individual messages to another user, post comments on another
user's profile page, publish bulletins that multiple users can see, or join
group discussions.22 Facebook similarly offers these methods 23 as well as
instant messaging capabilities.24 The vast array of options for sending
communications can easily lead to an abuse of this technology. 25 Because
of the ease of creating a profile under an alias, cyberstalkers and
cyberbullies can harass their victims anonymously. 26
Though MySpace explicitly prohibits activity that "harasses or
advocates harassment of another person, , 27 MySpace staff cannot possibly
monitor the millions of users that visit the site each month. 28 Thus, it is
possible that harassing material will ultimately reach a significant
percentage of individuals on MySpace. 29  There is definitely a need to
protect young people from the bullying that can happen on social
19. See Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalking, a New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness
of Current State and Federal Laws, 72 MO. L. REV. 125, 129 (2007) (explaining that the Internet
allows for messages to be instantaneously disseminated to individuals around the world).
20. AMANDA LENHART & MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET, SOCIAL NETWORKING
WEBSITES AND TEENS: AN OVERVIEW (2007),
http://www.pewinternet.org/-/media/Fies/Reports/2007/PIP-SNS-Data-MemoJan-2007.pdf.pd
f
21. See Justin W. Patchin & Sameer Hinduja, Bullies Move Beyond the Schoolyard: A
Preliminary Look at Cyberbullying, 4 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 148, 148 (2006).
22. MySpace Quick Tour, http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=userTour.home
(last visited Oct. 15, 2008).
23. See Facebook is on Facebook, supra note 4.
24. Elizabeth Landau, Facebook Unveils Instant Message Feature, CNN.COM,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/TECH/04/08/facebook.chat/index.htmil (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).
25. See Goodno, supra note 19, at 129 (noting that the intemet allows cyberstalkers to
quickly disseminate intimidating and threatening messages).
26. Id. at 130.
27. Terms & Conditions - MySpace.corn,
http://www.myspace.com/index.cfin?fuseaction=misc.tenns (last visited Apr. 16, 2009).
28. See Matthew C. Ruedy, Comment, Repercussions of a MySpace Teen Suicide: Should
Anti-Cyberbullying Laws be Created?, 9 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 323, 330 (2008) (stating that while
MySpace does reserve the right to terminate the membership of a person violating the terms of
service, it assumes no responsibility for monitoring the site for inappropriate content and that,
ultimately, it is the responsibility of the teenage users and parents to protect themselves).
29. See I-SAFE, INC., I-SAFE STATISTICS 2, http://isafe.org/imgs/pdf/mediakit/i-
SAFEStats.pdf (2008) ("22% of students know someone who has been bullied online.").
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networking sites, but young people must be protected responsibly. The
government cannot simply resort to questionable means for the sake of
punishing someone who harasses another online-even in situations like
that of Lori Drew.
B. The Story of "Josh " and Megan
Megan Meier met "Josh Evans" in the fall of 2006. They did not
meet at school or the mall-they met on MySpace.30 Megan had received
a friend request from Josh and asked her mother to let her start
communicating with Josh online. 3' Their messages began innocently
enough-just sharing information and getting to know each other-but
eventually Josh turned on Megan.32 On October 16, 2006, Josh sent
several hurtful messages to Megan and even posted mean public messages
on MySpace saying "Megan Meier is a slut... Megan Meier is fat."
33
According to Megan's father, Ron, the final message sent from Josh said,
"Everybody... knows how you are... everybody hates you... [t]he
world would be a better place without you." 34 After this barrage of insults,
Megan went to her room and took her life.35 Though this could have been
the end to this tragic story, it was only the beginning. 36
Six weeks after Megan's suicide, her parents found out that "Josh
Evans" never existed. 3 Megan's family learned that the profile had been
created by the mother of one of Megan's friends-someone who lived just
a few houses down from Megan and her family, 38 a person that the Meiers
knew and trusted. 39 The Meiers further learned that Lori Drew created the
profile "in order to 'find out what Megan.. . was saying on-line about her
daughter.' 40 As the story of the attacks on Megan unfolded in the media,
Lori Drew received international admonishment, but the county prosecutor
had no way to criminally charge her for the part she played in Megan's
30. Pokin, supra note 8.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Pokin, supra note 8.
37. Christopher Maag, A Hoax Turned Fatal Draws Anger but No Charges, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 2007, at A23.
38. Pokin, supra note 8.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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death. 41
Almost two years after Megan Meier's death, a federal jury in Los
Angeles convicted Lori Drew for cyber crimes that she allegedly
committed in the course of her interactions with Megan. However, these
alleged crimes had nothing to do with Megan's death.43 In an effort to find
some way to punish Lori Drew, the government used an anti-hacking
statute to criminalize everyday Internet activity. 44 In the U.S. Attorney's
view, Lori Drew had committed a federal crime 45 by ignoring the MySpace
Terms of Service (TOS) agreement, which prohibits creating a profile
under a fake name.46 After the trial, the jury convicted Lori Drew on three
counts of violating the CFAA, 47 but the tragic and appalling nature of the
48case may have clouded their judgment.
C. The Ubiquity of Terms of Service Agreements
Most, if not all, websites that offer services to users of the site have
TOS agreements. 49 TOS agreements are boilerplate agreements intended
to be legally binding contracts. The agreements establish rules and policies
that users must follow to access the services on a particular site. 50  The
users, therefore, have zero bargaining power and, in many cases, have no
choice but to assent to the terms if they want to use the site. 51
Websites present their terms in two types of agreements: "clickwrap"
41. Maag, supra note 37.
42. Zetter, supra note 5; Tamura, supra note 11.
43. See generally Zetter, supra note 5.
44. Id. (stating that the crime that the U.S. Attorney charged Lori Drew with stems from her
failure to meet the MySpace TOS agreement before using the site). Following this logic, any
other MySpace user who creates a profile without entering their real name is guilty of the same
crime, regardless of their subsequent activity on the site.
45. Indictment at 5, United States v. Drew, No. 08-00582 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2008)
[hereinafter Drew Indictment].
46. Terms & Conditions - MySpace.com, supra note 27 ("By using the MySpace Services,
you represent and warrant that.., all registration information you submit is truthful and
accurate .... ).
47. Tamura, supra note 11.
48. See Scott Glover, Myspace Trial Jurors Hear of Girl's Suicide, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20,
2008, at BI (stating that Ms. Drew's attorney had "asked that prosecutors be banned from
mentioning Megan's death because it would unduly prejudice the jury," but the court denied his
motion).
49. See, e.g., EFF Brief, supra note 13, at 14.
50. See Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REv. 459, 459 (2006).
51. Id. at 466; Rachel Cormier Anderson, Comment, Enforcement of Contractual Terms in
Clickwrap Agreements: Courts Refusing to Enforce Forum Selection and Binding Arbitration
Clauses, 3 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 11 (2007).
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and "browserwrap" agreements. 52 Clickwrap agreements present the user
of a particular site with its TOS and require the user to click on a button to
indicate that the user agrees to those terms. 53 Browserwrap agreements, in
contrast, only exist somewhere on a provider's site. 54 The user never sees
the TOS agreement, but their terms state that the user agrees to them
simply by visiting the site. 15 While it may seem irregular to enforce a
contract against someone who may have never read it, some courts have
enforced particular terms of browserwrap TOS agreements. 56 Nonetheless,
these cases involve businesses or other institutional users, and
commentators argue that holding individual users to the terms of the TOS
would be materially unfair. "
D. The Growth of the CFAA
The development of computers has contributed significantly to
advancements in American society. Nonetheless, fraud and other abuses of
computers led Congress to adopt the CFAA in 1984.58 The current version
of the CFAA imposes a criminal penalty on anyone who "intentionally
accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access,
and thereby obtains.., information contained in a financial record of a
financial institution... ; [or] information from any department or agency
of the United States; or ... information from any protected computer." 
59
The CFAA made it a federal crime to access a computer without
authorization for the purpose of committing fraud or causing damage.60
The original version of the statute only criminalized unauthorized access of
government or banking computers . 61 However, updates and amendments
have added language that makes it a violation of the CFAA to access a
52. Lemley, supra note 50, at 459-60.
53. Id. at 459.
54. Id. at 460.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (finding a
question of fact as to whether a website's browserwrap agreement was conspicuous enough to
alert users to its existence); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 428-30 (2d Cir. 2004)
(holding that a business that used a website was on notice of the terms of use of that site).
57. See Lemley, supra note 50, at 464 ("[l]f courts enforce browserwraps at all, enforcement
should be limited to the context in which it has so far occurred-against sophisticated commercial
entities who are repeat players.").
58. Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Computer
Fraud andAbuse Act (18 US.C. § 1030), 174 A.L.R. FED. 101, 101 (2001).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2006).
60. See id. § 1030.
61. Buckman, supra note 58, at 112.
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"protected computer" either without authorization or beyond the scope of
the authorization granted to the user.62  A "protected computer" in the
statute means a computer "which is used in interstate.., commerce or
communication." 63 Since any computer that is connected to the Internet is
used in "interstate communication," the CFAA potentially applies very
broadly. 64
This statute was originally "directed at protecting classified
information, financial records, and credit information on governmental or
financial institution computers.", 65  The overwhelming majority of
defendants charged with violating the CFAA have done so by either
hacking into a computer with the intention of gaining access to sensitive
information or by causing damage to a computer system. 66 Therefore, by
using the CFAA to convict Lori Drew, the U.S. Attorney has taken the
statute in a new direction.
Although the Government has effectively used the CFAA to
prosecute hackers over the years, Congress did not intend for the act to
criminalize violations of TOS agreements.67 The U.S. Attorney's novel
extension of the CFAA to prosecute Lori Drew not only ignores the intent
of the statute, but could also lead to an unprecedented number of
individuals committing federal crimes without any knowledge of
wrongdoing.
III. WHY THE CFAA IS THE WRONG TOOL FOR THE JOB
Lori Drew's conduct, while despicable, should not have been wrestled
into the scope of the CFAA 68-a statute that appears to only reach hackers
and other individuals that willfully access a computer without proper
authorization. 69 In an effort to convict Lori Drew of some type of crime
associated with her interactions with Megan Meier, the U.S. Attorney
brought charges under the CFAA for creating an account on MySpace that
62. Id. at 113.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (2006).
64. By covering all computers connected to the Internet, the CFAA has the potential to
reach 73% of Americans. See Infoplease.com, Percentage of Internet Users in the U.S., 2008,
http://www.infoplease.com/science/computers/demographics-internet-users.html (last visited
Nov. 22, 2008) (stating data that suggests 73% of American adults have Internet access).
65. Buckman, supra note 58, at 112.
66. See id.
67. See Official Comment, 18 U.S.C. 1030 (1984) (discussing the reasoning behind the
statute, which was to criminalize the relatively new threat of hackers).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
69. See supra Part II.D.
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violated the site's TOS Agreement. 70 This theory states that by breaching
MySpace's TOS agreement, Lori Drew exceeded the scope of the access
she had been granted to a "protected computer.", 71 Though the theory
allowed the government to obtain a conviction 72 and bring some much
needed solace to Megan Meier's family, the government's action was
ultimately a mistake. The government should not have brought charges
against Lori Drew under the CFAA in the first place.
A. Breaching a TOS Agreement Should Not Constitute a Violation of the
CFAA
Since the 1984 codification of the CFAA, several cases have applied
the statute to individual conduct; interestingly though, none support the
position that the U.S. Attorney proffered in Lori Drew's case.73 While the
CFAA had traditionally been used to punish those that used devious means
to access and, then, harm or steal sensitive information, 74 the U.S. Attorney
managed to hold Lori Drew criminally liable for violating a civil contract
(the MySpace TOS agreement). 7 This theory of liability ignores the plain
language of the CFAA as well as grossly expands the idea of "exceeding
authorized access" within the statute.76
1. The Value of Plain English
A jury convicted Lori Drew of violating the CFAA, which punishes
an individual who "intentionally access[es] a computer without
authorization... and thereby obtains.., information from any protected
computer... involved in interstate or foreign communication." 77 A plain
language reading of this statute leads to the conclusion that Congress
designed it to punish computer trespass. The terms "intentionally access"
70. Drew Indictment, supra note 45, at 6.
71. Id. at9.
72. Id. at 1.
73. The case history of the CFAA usually includes individuals being charged with the
destruction or theft of valuable information. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 511
(2d Cir. 1991) (finding that the defendant violated the CFAA by sending a "worm" that harmed
various computers); United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 497 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the
defendant violated the CFAA by interfering with a computer-based emergency communication
system); United States v. Lloyd, 269 F.3d 228, 243 (3d Cir. 2001) (convicting defendant of
violating the CFAA by destroying files on his employer's computers).
74. See cases cited supra note 73.
75. Drew Indictment, supra note 45, at 1.
76. See discussion infra Part III.A. 1-2.
77. 18 U.S.C § 1030 (2006).
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and "without authorization" indicate that the statute should only reach the
conduct of individuals who purposefully gain access to a specific
computer.78 Additionally, the emphasis on "obtain[ing] information"
suggests that hackers and other information thieves are the intended focus
of the CFAA.79
This plain language interpretation of the CFAA should constrain the
scope of the statute because a court may invalidate any law for
unconstitutional vagueness if it proscribes conduct not clearly established
in its language. 80  However, by charging Lori Drew with violating the
CFAA, the U.S. Attorney's office appears to have ignored the plain
language of the statute. 81  By suggesting that the breach of a TOS
agreement-involving no intentional unauthorized access of a computer-
falls within the scope of the CFAA, the government has forced many
innocuous activities into the realm of criminal conduct.
Lori Drew did not circumvent any security measures or access
protected data on a protected computer, she merely established an account
on MySpace under a fake name. 82 Therefore, her conduct was not the type
that the CFAA was enacted to prevent.83 When reading the unambiguous
terms referring to the "intentional unauthorized access," 84 it seems clear
that the CFAA should not punish an individual who neither sought to
obtain information from, nor cause harm to, a particular computer.
The legislative history supports a plain language interpretation that
the goal of the statute was to quell the activities of hackers. 85 The House
Committee that enacted the legislation explained that "the conduct
prohibited is analogous to that of 'breaking and entering' rather than using
a computer (similar to the use of a gun) in committing the offense." 86 This
evidence suggests that the enacting body chose the words of the statute for
particular clarity.
Courts have also taken the position that the clear language of the
statute indicates that it was intended to criminalize intentionally malicious
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353 (1983) (describing that vague statutes are a
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution); discussion infra Part
III.C.
81. See 18 U.S.C § 1030.
82. See supra Part II.D.
83. See supra Part II.D.
84. 18 U.S.C § 1030 (2006).
85. H.R. REP. No. 98-894, at 20 (1984).
86. Id.
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conduct. 7 For example, in applying a similar subsection of the statute, the
court in US v. Morris stated that intentional conduct was required to show a
violation of the statute. '8 In applying this unambiguous language to the
conduct that led to the conviction of Lori Drew, it appears that an
unintentional violation of the MySpace TOS agreement fails to meet the
requirements of the CFAA.89 Merely failing to supply truthful identity
information seems quite different than intentionally causing harm through
the unauthorized access of a computer.
Through Lori Drew's conviction, the government has substantially
expanded the scope of the CFAA. Unfortunately, this means that anyone
who fails to provide accurate information to MySpace or Facebook could
be guilty of a federal crime. 90 While Lori Drew certainly deserved some
form of punishment, her conviction may cause a serious problem for a large
number of Americans. The expanded scope of the CFAA could make it
illegal for anyone to use a website in violation of a TOS agreement.
2. Are We "Exceeding Authorized Access?"
The government convicted Lori Drew for exceeding the authorized
access granted by MySpace when she failed to comply with the limitations
on access imposed by the site's TOS agreement. 91  This conviction,
therefore, greatly expands the concept of when an individual can exceed
their authorized access. On the contrary though, recent cases exploring the
idea of "exceeding authorized access" apply the CFAA more narrowly than
the government did in Lori Drew's case. 
92
The original language of the CFAA found a crime only when
unauthorized individuals accessed a "protected computer." 93  However,
87. See cases cited supra note 73.
88. See United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 509 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that the statute
only punishes those who intentionally access a computer without authorization).
89. See Id.
90. The TOS agreements of both of these sites require users to provide complete and
accurate information. See Terms & Conditions - MySpace.com, supra note 27; Facebook Terms
of Use, http://www.facebook.com/facebook?ref=pf#/terms.php?ref=pf (last visited Sept. 26,
2008).
91. See Drew Indictment, supra note 45, at 5.
92. See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wemer-Masuda, 390 F.
Supp. 2d 479, 499 (D. Md. 2005) (rejecting the argument that a contractually prohibited use of a
computer violated the CFAA); Diamond Power Int'l, Inc. v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322,
1343 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (explaining "a violation... occurs where.., the access of certain
information is not permitted."); Brett Senior & Assocs. v. Fitzgerald, 2007 WL 2043377, at *2
(E.D. Pa. July 13, 2007) (explaining that the defendant "cannot be liable under the statute unless
he, at a minimum, trespassed into [plaintiff's] computer system").
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1984).
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Congress amended the statute in 1986 to include the phrase "exceeds
authorized access."94 One court explained that this was done to remove
ambiguity from cases in which an authorized user of a "protected
computer" used that computer for unauthorized purposes. 95  The U.S.
Attorney's view, as evidenced by Lori Drew's conviction, is that using a
website in violation of its TOS exceeds the authorized access of that
website. 96 This view represents a broadening of the idea of "exceeding
authorized access," which appears contrary to recent court decisions and
scholarship advocating a narrower view of this particular CFAA
provision. 97
Professor Orin S. Kerr argues that "[c]ourts should reject a contract-
based theory of authorization, and should limit the scope of unauthorized
access statutes to circumvention of code-based restrictions on computer
privileges."'9 8  Statutes and courts should, therefore, define the activities
that amount to unauthorized access, instead of permitting private
individuals to dictate the law through contracts. 99 This would allow
"individuals to use the Internet without fear of criminal prosecution for a
violation of sometimes incomprehensible contractual limits on use." 
100
Professor Kerr's idea becomes acutely relevant when exploring
several TOS agreements. Many websites' TOS agreements contain vague
and ambiguous terminology, have unexpected terms, and are not easily
accessible to users. 101 Therefore, even if civil courts held these agreements
enforceable against all users, Professor Kerr argues that it would not make
sense to use the CFAA to extend that civil liability into criminal court. 102
Professor Kerr wanted to dissuade courts from expanding the broad
interpretation of "exceeding authorized access" that had recently developed
at the time of his writing. 103 Apparently, the courts listened to Professor
94. Id., amended by Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2(c) (1986).
95. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 499 n.12.
96. Drew Indictment, supra note 45, at 5.
97. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 92; Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting
"Access" and "Authorization" in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1643
(2003).
98. Kerr, supra note 97, at 1596.
99. See id. at 1600 ("The fact that computer use violates a contractual restriction should not
turn that use into an unauthorized access.").
100. Id.
101. See EFF Brief, supra note 13, at 10-11, 31-34; Google Terms Of Service,
http://www.google.com/accounts/TOS (last visited Apr. 13, 2009).
102. See Kerr, supra note 97, at 1600 (arguing that it would be unfair for courts to extend
the civil liability from violating computer use agreements into the criminal context).
103. Id. at 1600-01.
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Kerr's recommendations because judges began reducing the scope of the
CFAA by narrowly interpreting the terms "authorization" and "access." 104
These cases represent a more appropriate application of the CFAA in
situations where a violation of contractual terms could potentially lead to
criminal liability.
In International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v.
Werner-Masuda, the Maryland District Court rejected the plaintiffs
argument that using a union computer to access a membership list, in
breach of an employment agreement, resulted in a union officer's violation
of the CFAA. 105 The court found the defendant's conduct was not
criminal, even though the defendant had breached the contract. 106 The
court explained:
[t]o the extent that Werner-Masuda may have breached the
Registration Agreement by using the information obtained for
purposes contrary to the policies established ... , it does not
follow, as a matter of law, that she was not authorized to access
the information, or that she did so in excess of her authorization
in violation of... the CFAA. 117
Like the employment contract that established the parameters for
authorized access in Werner-Masuda, a TOS agreement sets out conditions
that a user must meet before they are granted access to a particular
website. 108 While a user may face consequences from breaching the TOS
agreement, the failure to uphold the contract does not make a user's usage
of the site an intentional unauthorized access of information. 109 Therefore,
applying the court's reasoning in Werner-Masuda to Lori Drew's case
implies an opposite conclusion than what ultimately occurred. 110 Werner-
Masuda suggests that establishing a violation of the CFAA requires
something more than the breach of a contract; 111 perhaps intentional efforts
must be used to procure unauthorized access.
104. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 92.
105. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d
479, 498 (D. Md. 2005).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Terms & Conditions - MySpace.com, supra note 27 ("This Agreement is accepted
upon your use of the MySpace Website or any of the MySpace Services and is further affirmed by
you becoming a Member."); Facebook Terms of Use, supra note 90 ("By accessing or using our
web site.., you [the "User"] signify that you have read, understand and agree to be bound by
these Terms ... ").
109. See Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 498.
110. See id.
111. See id.
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A website's TOS agreement does not necessarily preclude access to
the information on the site-at least not in the same way a password or
other code-based impediment would. 112 Though MySpace requires a
username and password to access an account, the accounts themselves are
given freely to anyone that requests them. 113 In fact, on MySpace's signup
page, users need only input their information and click a box that signifies
they agree to the TOS; 114 MySpace does not attempt to enforce the
provisions of the TOS before granting access. 15 Therefore, a visitor to the
MySpace website has not had to circumvent restrictions in order to access
the services therein and should not qualify as an unauthorized user for the
purposes of the CFAA. 116 This reasoning also appears more in line with
the original intent for the CFAA-punishing hackers for bypassing security
measures and accessing protected information. "'
B. An Improper Reliance on TOS Agreements
Lori Drew's conviction for violating the CFAA is based on her failure
to comply with the MySpace TOS agreement. 1s This means that any
Internet user who breaches a website's agreement may be indicted under
the same charges. This places an improper significance on a potentially
unconscionable and unclear contract.
1. Unconscionability of TOS Agreements
For her conduct to rise to the level of violating the CFAA, Lori Drew
would have to access MySpace's servers without proper authorization. 119
The government theorized that this occurred when Lori Drew violated the
112. See Kerr, supra note 97, at 1600 (explaining the difference between contractual and
code-based restrictions).
113. See MySpace.com Profile Signup Page,
http://signups.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=signup (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).
114. See id. ("By clicking Sign Up, you are agreeing to the Myspace Terms of Service and
Privacy Policy.").
115. For example, the site does not attempt to validate identification information before
allowing the user to access the site. See id.
116. Much like Ms. Werner-Masuda, a user who creates a MySpace account in violation of
the TOS agreement has breached that contract. However, this is not tantamount to a hacker who
has used unscrupulous means to access information outside the scope of authorization; see
Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 498.
117. See H.R. REP. No. 98-894, at 20 (1984) (illustrating that the legislature enacted the
CFAA in order to be able to punish hackers and others for what amounted to computer trespass).
118. Drew Indictment, supra note 45, at 6.
119. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006) ("exceeding authorized access").
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MySpace TOS agreement, which prohibits supplying false information. 120
In effect, the government has imposed criminal liability for violating a
contractual term-in a type of contract that even civil courts are reluctant
to enforce. 121 In cases where courts have considered whether a website's
TOS agreement was enforceable against a user, many courts have not
upheld these terms in order to protect consumers. 122 The basic principles
of contract law suggest that such importance should not be placed on TOS
agreements. 123
The doctrine of unconscionability suggests that a party should not
have to uphold its part of a contract that would result in a distinctly unfair
outcome. 124 The official comment to the U.C.C. clearly states that "[t]he
principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise." 1
25
This goal of preventing oppression and unfair surprise has lead to the
adoption of substantive and procedural unconscionability. 126 For example,
in NEC Technologies, Inc. v. Nelson, the court stated:
Procedural unconscionability addresses the process of making
the contract, while substantive unconscionability looks to the
contractual terms themselves. A non-inclusive list of some
factors courts have considered in determining whether a contract
is procedurally unconscionable includes the age, education,
intelligence, business acumen and experience of the parties, their
relative bargaining power, the conspicuousness and
comprehensibility of the contract language .... 127
Applying the factors laid out in NEC Technologies to TOS
agreements could easily result in the determination that these contracts are
120. Drew Indictment, supra note 45, at 6; Terms & Conditions - MySpace.com, supra note
27.
121. See discussion supra Part II.C.
122. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35-38 (2d Cir. 2002)
(refusing to hold consumers liable for terms in boilerplate agreement on a website); Campbell v.
Gen. Dynamics Gov't Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546, 556-57 (tst Cir. 2005) (holding that an employer
could not change a provision of an employment agreement by posting it on the company
intranet); Waters v. Earthlink, Inc., 91 F. Appx. 697, 698 (1st Cir. 2003) (requiring proof that a
consumer had seen an arbitration clause before enforcing the provision).
123. See, e.g., 7 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 29.1, at 377 (Joseph M.
Perillo ed., Matthew Bender 2002) (1951).
124. Id.
125. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2003) (Official Comment).
126. See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 487 (1967) (labeling the formation of the contract as procedural
unconscionability (surprise) and the content of the contract as substantive unconscionability
(oppression)).
127. NEC Techs., Inc. v. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d 769, 771-72 (Ga. 1996) (citations omitted).
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both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. 128 The TOS
agreements of most sites are hidden behind a hyperlink at the bottom of a
webpage and are long, unorganized, and written in incomprehensible
legalese. 129 For example, the TOS agreement for eBay can only be found
by searching for the "User Agreement" hyperlink in fine print at the bottom
of the site's home page. 130 Clicking the link takes users to a 3,000-word
agreement that would be difficult to understand for anyone without a strong
background in contract law. 131 Additionally, these agreements are standard
boilerplate contracts that offer zero bargaining power to the users of the
website; 132 users have no choice but to agree to the terms as the site
presents them. 133
Though this ambiguous language does not make TOS agreements per
se unconscionable, the seemingly unfair nature of these contracts seriously
casts doubt on their enforceability. 134 Because it may be unfair to enforce
the terms of most TOS agreements on website visitors, assigning a criminal
penalty for non-compliance with these terms would grant far too much
weight to these contracts. While scholars and courts still disagree on the
enforceability of TOS agreements on the civil side, it seems improper to
assign criminal penalties for violating the terms of these agreements. 135
2. The Vagaries of TOS Agreements
The inherent imperfection of TOS agreements extends beyond its
potential unconscionability: many TOS agreements also contain
unexpected terms and may change without notice. 136 For example,
128. Since most users of websites are relative laymen when it comes to TOS contracts, their
lack of experience and business acumen would support a finding of procedural unconscionability;
the fact that TOS agreements often contain ambiguous and difficult to find terms goes to their
substantive unconscionability. See id.
129. EFF Brief, supra note 13, at 10-11.
130. Ebay.com, http://www.ebay.com (last visited Nov. 16, 2008).
131. See Your User Agreement, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-
agreement.html?_trksid=m40 (last visited Nov. 16, 2008).
132. Anderson, supra note 51.
133. Id.; Lemley, supra note 50, at 465-66.
134. See CORBIN, supra note 123, at 379 ("Equity however .... will frequently order the
avoidance of contracts.").
135. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 50, at 472-76 (discussing the reluctance of courts to
unilaterally enforce contracts on web pages); Anderson, supra note 51 (explaining how recent
cases have established a trend in enforcing standard provisions against business users, but not
against consumers).
136. See, e.g., Google Terms Of Service, supra note 101 (providing that "the form and
nature of the services which Goggle provides may change from time to time without prior notice
to you").
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Google's TOS requires that anyone using its services first accept its
contractual terms. 137 Moreover, the terms state, "[y]ou may not use the
Services and may not accept the Terms if... you are not of legal age to
form a binding contract with Google." 138
In the aftermath of Lori Drew's conviction for violating the CFAA,
any minor who performs a search on Google is now accessing a "protected
computer" and, thus, is susceptible to federal prosecution.139 This
unexpected term, coupled with the fact that Google's TOS is relatively
hidden on its site, 140 illustrates the danger of attaching criminal liability to
the violation of TOS agreements.
C. Using the CFAA to Punish a TOS Violation is Unconstitutional
Even though the application of the CFAA to criminalize infringement
on a civil contract seems inappropriate, that is not the most significant
problem with Lori Drew's conviction. Instead, the usage of the CFAA to
criminalize conduct like that of Lori Drew constitutes an encroachment on
civil liberties, e.g., the constitutional right to due process of law, 141 the
freedom of speech, 142 and individual privacy. 143 If failing to comply with
a website's TOS agreement in any and all circumstances violates the
CFAA, 144 then the government will directly abridge these fundamental
rights.
1. Even MySpace Users Are Due Their Process
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution's Due Process clause
guarantees that the government cannot deprive an individual of "life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." 145 The Supreme Court
interprets this clause to protect both procedural and substantive due
process. 146 This means the government must follow proper procedures
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See generally Drew Indictment, supra note 45 (showing that any violation of a TOS
agreement may subject a user to criminal prosecution).
140. Google's TOS agreement can only be accessed by clicking a small link at the bottom of
the site's main page. See Google, http://www.google.com (last visited March 24, 2009).
141. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
142. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
143. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that there are certain
"zone[s] of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees").
144. See Drew Indictment, supra note 45, at 1.
145. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
146. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
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when interfering with an individual's liberties, have a valid reason for the
interference, and use narrowly tailored means to achieve its interest. 147
The extension of the CFAA to criminalize violations of TOS agreements
implicates both substantive and procedural due process because it infringes
on individual liberties and causes the inconsistent terms of such agreements
to have great importance. 148 While Part III.C.3 fully discusses the
substantive issues below, the procedural matters have great significance as
well.
A fundamental aspect of ensuring due process of law requires the
government to clearly define what conduct a particular statute makes
illegal. 149 Therefore, a criminal statute is invalid if it "fails to give a person
of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden." 150 This standard appears to invalidate the U.S. Attorney's
suggested interpretation of the CFAA: if traditionally vague and difficult
to understand TOS agreements hold the same weight as criminal statutes,
then the average Internet user would have difficulty fully comprehending
exactly what conduct carries criminal liability. 151
In Kolender v. Lawson, the Supreme Court struck down a California
statute for being unconstitutionally vague as to what conduct actually
violated the law in question. 152 The statute at issue in Kolender required
persons loitering on the street to produce "credible and reliable"
identification to a requesting police officer. 153 The court determined the
statute violated Due Process because it was not sufficiently clear to alert
ordinary citizens as to what specific conduct the statute criminalized. 154 In
the opinion of the court, Justice O'Connor stated, "[o]ur Constitution is
designed to maximize individual freedoms within a framework of ordered
liberty. Statutory limitations on those freedoms are examined for
substantive authority and content as well as for definiteness or certainty of
expression." 155
With the conviction of Lori Drew, the government has clearly
adopted a statutory limitation on freedom with no clear definition of the
147. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
148. See Carolene, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
149. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) ("No one may be required at
peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to
be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.").
150. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
151. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the vague nature of TOS agreements).
152. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983).
153. Id. at 353.
154. Id. at 361.
155. Id. at 357.
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criminal activity subject to liability. 156 Since the outcome of Lori Drew's
case means that all TOS agreements carry criminal liability for their
violation, the CFAA can only be as clear as these inherently abstruse
contracts. 157 The lack of clarity contained in TOS agreements has led the
CFAA down the road of unconstitutional vagary. 158
The Supreme Court also opined that the "void-for-vagueness doctrine
requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient
definiteness.., in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement." 159 Much like the statute at issue in Kolender,
a CFAA that relies on TOS agreements will lead to arbitrary
enforcement. 160 The government has no control over what terms a website
places in its TOS agreement, federal attorneys will thus be forced to either
prosecute users who are in violation of atypical terms or arbitrarily enforce
some agreements and not others. 161 For example, a website could place a
term in its TOS agreement stating that women could not use the site. The
government would then either have to bring all female users up on federal
charges or decide not to enforce this specific term; thereby "vest[ing]
virtually complete discretion in the hands" of federal prosecutors to decide
when to enforce a website's terms-something that Due Process does not
allow. 162
2. Freedom of Speeeh to Be Held Criminally Liable
The Supreme Court in Kolender also worried about the 'potential
for arbitrarily suppressing First Amendment liberties ..... 163 The same
concern should have impacted the court in the Lori Drew case where the
U.S. Attorney extended the CFAA to include website TOS violations. 164
While extending the CFAA in this way may sufficiently punish online
156. See Drew Indictment, supra note 45, at 4-5 (relying on MySpace's unclear and easily
modified TOS agreement to find liability under the CFAA).
157. See, e.g., Terms & Conditions - MySpace.com, supra note 27; Facebook Terms of
Use, supra note 90; Yahoo! Terms of Service, http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos-
173.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
158. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357 (stating that criminal statutes must "define the criminal
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand").
159. Id.
160. Kerr, supra note 97, at 1659.
161. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (stating that when a statute is vague, it "may permit 'a
standardless sweep [that] allows... prosecutors ... to pursue their personal predilections"')
(citation omitted).
162. Id.
163. Id. (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 91 (1965)).
164. See Drew Indictment, supra note 45, at 6.
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harassment, the "prospect of crime ... does not justify laws suppressing
protected speech." 165 The Supreme Court has held that speech on the
Internet is protected by the First Amendment. 166 Thus, online speech
warrants the same level of protection as other protected speech. 167 The
criminalization that might occur under the new construction of the CFAA
will severely undermine this protection. 168 The protections of free speech,
including the ability to speak one's mind without fear of prosecution,
should prohibit the CFAA from criminalizing violations of TOS
agreements. 169
By giving websites the power to dictate criminal liability simply
through their seldom-viewed TOS agreements, the government is
permitting actions that could potentially lead to serious interference with
free speech. 170 Websites could include clauses in their TOS agreements
prohibiting political or other particular opinions on public issues-exactly
the type of speech that the Framers intended to protect through the First
Amendment. 171 Such prohibitions would bring such protected speech
within the reach of the CFAA. 172 Additionally, the vast protections
afforded by the First Amendment go beyond simply protecting specific
instances of speech, even invalidating some laws that might cause speakers
to self-censor. 173
In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court struck down
a law prohibiting "virtual child pornography" 174 because of its First
Amendment implications. 175 The government certainly had noble motives
in crafting the statute at issue in Ashcroft, just like the motives behind
165. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002).
166. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (stating that Supreme Court cases
"provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to
[the Internet]").
167. See id. at 868-70 (distinguishing the Internet from other speech restrictive mediums).
168. See EFF Brief, supra note 13, at 25 (arguing that the government's interpretation of the
CFAA would make activities protected by the First Amendment "the basis for criminal liability").
169. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 244 ("[I]mposing criminal penalties on protected speech is a
stark example of speech suppression.").
170. See Kerr, supra note 97, at 1659 (arguing that breaching TOS agreements implicates
criminal law and could "suppress a significant amount of free speech").
171. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (holding that "debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open").
172. See Kerr, supra note 97, at 1659.
173. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 244 (invalidating a law because it might lead some
individuals to abstain from speech out of fear of prosecution, even though the speech would
technically be protected under the First Amendment).
174. Id. at 241.
175. Id. at 244, 258.
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applying the CFAA to Lori Drew's conduct. The provisions at issue in
both cases may have even been quite effective at accomplishing their
desired outcomes, namely protecting children and preventing online
harassment. 176 Regardless, the government cannot achieve these goals
through the proscription of protected speech, even if the majority of speech
prohibited would receive no First Amendment protection. 177 This First
Amendment requirement led the court in Ashcroft to hold that the terms of
the statute were "overbroad and vague" and, therefore, could possibly lead
some individuals to refrain from protected speech out of fear of
prosecution. 178
Similarly, since private websites are now permitted to define the
parameters of a federal criminal statute through their TOS agreements, 179
some Internet users might refrain from exercising their freedom of speech
because of the potential penalties. Since users may not clearly understand
which type of speech a particular website might proscribe, their safest
option would be to refrain from any speech. It is precisely this "chilling"
of constitutionally protected speech that invalidated the law at issue in
Ashcroft180 and should require the overturning of the government's
extension of the CFAA to include TOS violations. 181 As the Ashcroft
court stated:
The Government may not suppress lawful speech as the means
to suppress unlawful speech. Protected speech does not become
unprotected merely because it resembles the latter. The
Constitution requires the reverse .... The overbreadth doctrine
prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech if a
substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in
the process. 182
The proposed increase in the scope of the CFAA "abridges the
freedom to engage in a substantial amount of lawful speech" 183 and, thus,
should not be allowed. "The Constitution gives significant protection from
176. For the government's reasoning behind the CPAA, which prohibited virtual child
pornography, see id. at 241-42. The reasoning behind the indictment of Lori Drew, though a
little more difficult to parse out, is most likely due to the desire to punish her any way possible;
see Maag, supra note 37.
177. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 245 (holding that the "prospect of crime... does not justify
laws suppressing protected speech").
178. Id. at 243, 256.
179. See Drew Indictment, supra note 45, at 6.
180. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 243, 256.
181. See id. at 255.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 256.
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overbroad laws that chill speech within the First Amendment's vast and
privileged sphere." 184 This protection means that the U.S. Attorney cannot
arbitrarily increase the CFAA's scope in such a way that could lead to
unconstitutional self-censorship.
3. The Right to Remain Anonymous
Anonymity has a special significance on the Internet. 185 The unique
nature of the Internet allows individuals to "choose to say what [they] want
to a mass audience in ways that obscure or conceal [their] real
identities." 186 This ability to speak anonymously allows many individuals
to share their true feelings without fear of retribution or to participate in
activities that they would not want their neighbors to know about. 187 Most
Internet users take comfort in the idea that their online presence is not
directly connected to their offline world. 188 Despite the value of
anonymous online speech, and the constitutional protections of anonymity
and privacy, the government has effectively erased this protection by
imposing criminal liability for providing false identification information to
a website. 189
The Supreme Court has stated that "fundamental rights" are protected
by the Constitution from subversion by both the federal and state
governments. 190 Certain liberties that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition" are given stringent protection by the Constitution. 191
Anonymity is precisely the type of liberty that finds its roots bound up with
the history of this nation. 192 When Alexander Hamilton and James
Madison were advocating for the passage of the Constitution, they chose to
publish their arguments under pseudonyms. 193 The fact that these
184. Id. at 244.
185. See MIKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS: DEFENDING FREE SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE
143-44 (rev. ed. 2003) (explaining that many individuals feel shielded from outside scrutiny
simply because no one knows their true identity when they post online).
186. Id. at 143.
187. See Anonymity/Psuedonymity, Electronic Frontier Foundation,
http://w2.eff.org/Privacy/Anonymity/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
188. See id.
189. See Drew Indictment, supra note 45, at 6 (indicting Lori Drew for failing to disclose
her true identity).
190. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); (providing examples of
incorporated constitutional rights).
191. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503.
192. EFF Brief, supra note 13, at 23-24.
193. ALBERT FURTWANGLER, THE AUTHORITY OF PUBLIUS: A READING OF THE
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"architects of the Constitution" 194 published their works anonymously
speaks volumes regarding the deeply-rooted nature of this liberty and the
constitutional protection that it should receive. Additionally, the
Constitution's protection of free speech would surely be implicated if the
government begins enforcing contractual requirements of identity
disclosure. 195
Many websites, including MySpace and Facebook, have clauses in
their TOS agreements that require users to provide accurate personal
information. 196 After the government's conviction of Lori Drew for
violating the CFAA, anyone who exercises their constitutionally protected
right of anonymity on these sites will commit a federal crime. 197 Private
websites are operating well within their power when they infringe on a
constitutional right, but once the government gets involved with the
enforcement of a website's TOS, the Constitution gains some teeth. 198
While it might be constitutionally permissible for MySpace to require
users to disclose their personal information in a private contract, the
Constitution precludes the government from enforcing such a provision. 199
In Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of
Stratton, the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that required door-
to-door canvassers to first obtain a permit before canvassing in the village
FEDERALIST PAPERS 18 (1984).
194. Id. at 23.
195. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
164 (2002) (holding a law that required door-to-door canvassers to first obtain a permit violated
the First Amendment).
196. See, e.g., Terms & Conditions - MySpace.com, supra note 27 ("By using the MySpace
Services, you represent and warrant that.., all registration information you submit is truthful and
accurate .... "); Facebook Terms of Use, supra note 90 ("In consideration of your use of the Site,
you agree to (a) provide accurate, current and complete information about you as may be
prompted by any registration forms on the Site ('Registration Data');... (c) maintain and
promptly update the Registration Data, and any other information you provide to Company, to
keep it accurate, current and complete .. "); Yahoo! Terms of Service, supra note 157 ("You
also agree to: (a) provide true, accurate, current and complete information about yourself as
prompted by the Yahoo! Service's registration form (the 'Registration Data') and (b) maintain
and promptly update the Registration Data to keep it true, accurate, current and complete.");
Google Terms of Service, supra note 101 ("You agree that any registration information you give
to Google will always be accurate, correct and up to date.").
197. See Drew Indictment, supra note 45, at 6 (stating that Ms. Drew's violation of the
CFAA occurred when she accessed the MySpace service by entering a false name).
198. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20, 22 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of
a private agreement qualifies as state action, which may lead to the agreement being struck down
as unconstitutional).
199. See Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 164 (holding that a law requiring door-to-door canvassers
to first obtain a permit before canvassing violated the First Amendment).
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of Stratton. 200 The ordinance also required canvassers to present the
identifying permit, containing their name, on demand. 20' The plaintiffs in
Watchtower were religious proselytizers who went door-to-door to discuss
their religion, though the court also took into account the effect the permit
requirements might have on the spreading of other types of information,
202including political canvassing.
Just as the Jehovah's Witnesses in Watchtower attempted to spread
religious ideas through canvassing the village of Stratton, many individuals
similarly use the Internet, and particularly social networking sites, to spread
their ideas, thoughts, opinions, and political messages. 203 The court in
Watchtower determined that it was unconstitutional to require someone to
divulge their identity before they could share their ideas, 20 but that is
exactly what the government has done by enforcing the identity disclosure
requirement in the MySpace TOS agreement. As the Internet has become
tantamount to the traditional public forums of old, Watchtower suggests
that people have the constitutionally protected right to broadcast their
views online anonymously. 20 5 Because Lori Drew's conviction established
that it is a federal crime to violate the TOS agreements of MySpace,
Facebook, Yahoo! and Google, all of which require the accurate disclosure
of personal information,206 the government is infringing on the rights of
users of these sites.
In deciding Watchtower, the court stressed the value of anonymity
when disseminating information: "'[t]he decision in favor of anonymity
may be motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern
about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one's
privacy as possible."'2 07 These same motivations exist when individuals
communicate online and so should the constitutional protections of privacy
and anonymity. The right to assert one's opinion anonymously on the
Internet easily follows from the traditional value given to anonymity and
200. Id.
201. Id. at 155.
202. Id. at 153.
203. See, e.g., Jodi Kantor, Obama's Online Strategy Seeks Big Bonus From Small Turnout,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2007, at AI (describing how supporters of Barack Obama organized on a
specialized social networking site).
204. Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 164.
205. See id.
206. See Terms & Conditions - MySpace.com, supra note 27; Facebook Terms of Use,
supra note 90; Yahoo! Terms of Service, supra note 157; Google Terms of Service, supra note
101.
207. Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 166 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S.
334, 341-42 (1995)).
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the fundamental right to privacy that the Supreme Court has stated extends
from the Constitution.208  Extending the scope of the CFAA to allow
private websites to dictate the elements of a criminal statute through their
TOS agreements runs contrary to many American concepts of freedom and
liberty-but this is exactly what the government has done.
In light of the numerous problems associated with Lori Drew's
conviction for violating the CFAA, 209 in addition to the possible
constitutional ramifications, the government should not have applied the
statute in this particular situation. The appalling nature of Lori Drew's
activities coupled with the apparent inability to bring charges under another
statute led the U.S. Attorney's office to make a far reaching decision
simply to effectuate justice. 21 0 However, the government would never
have made such a decision if proper means of combating online harassment
were available.
IV. THE OTHER WAYS To COMBAT ONLINE HARASSMENT
In a perfect world, Lori Drew would face severe consequences for her
role in Megan Meier's death. Regardless, the government's extension of
the CFAA does far more than punish Lori Drew for her activities on
MySpace.211 If the government begins enforcing the CFAA as it did
against Lori Drew, there will be serious ramifications beyond the facts of
that single case: it will effectively "convert the millions of internet-using
Americans who disregard the terms of service associated with online
services into federal criminals., 212  The government should use other
statutory methods to prevent future conduct like that of Lori Drew; it need
not unconstitutionally expand the scope of the CFAA to combat harassment
on the Internet.
A. Current Laws
The U.S. Attorney's use of an inappropriate statute to punish Lori
Drew for causing Megan Meier's suicide illustrates the difficulty in
applying current legislation to cyberbullying and cyberstalking cases.213
Many current laws are too antiquated to adequately combat the emerging
208. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (discussing certain "zone[s] of
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees").
209. See discussion supra Part III.A-B.
210. See Drew Indictment, supra note 45, at 1.
211. See U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2006).
212. EFF Brief, supra note 13, at 4.
213. See Drew Indictment, supra note 45, at 1.
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214forms of online harassment. While some states have taken the initiative
to create laws to specifically address these new issues,215 many states and
the federal government have aging statutes containing significant gaps,
despite the legislatures' attempts to institute updates. 216
1. On the Federal Books
Most federal statutes available to combat cyberbullying and other
forms of online harassment originally only handled traditional stalking and
harassment. 217 This archaic design frequently leads to inadequacies in
these statutes. 218 Consequently, individuals, and especially children, who
find themselves dealing with harassing messages online generally have
little recourse. 219 Although social networking sites like Facebook and
MySpace have specific provisions in their TOS agreements that prohibit
users from sending harassing or threatening communications, deleting the
offending user's account is usually the only possible punishment these sites
can levy. 220 Nonetheless, using an overly broad interpretation of the
CFAA will cause too much conduct to fall into the realm of illegality.
Therefore, federal statutes that specifically address the issues of
cyberbullying and cyberstalking are necessary to combat the problem.
Despite the fact that federal statutes enacted to punish stalking and
other forms of harassment did not initially leave room for new methods of
possible victimization, some recent efforts have been made to update the
statutes. 221 For example, the Violence Against Women Act222 (VAWA)
214. Goodno, supra note 19, at 156.
215. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/12-7.5 (2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:40.3 (Supp. 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15 (2000 & Supp. 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-196.3 (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-4.2 (2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.61.260 (Supp.
2004).
216. Goodno, supra note 19, at 140-52.
217. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2006) (making it a crime to transmit "any threat" to
injure a person in "interstate commerce"); 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006) (making it illegal to
anonymously and knowingly use a "telecommunications device" to "annoy, abuse, threaten or
harass" a person); 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2006) (criminalizing conduct that involves interstate
stalking that places victims in "reasonable fear of death").
218. Goodno, supra note 19, at 147-52.
219. See id. at 125 (describing how victims have few options to combat online harassers).
220. See Terms & Conditions - MySpace.com, supra note 27; Facebook Terms of Use,
supra note 90.
221. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006) (exemplifying a stalking statute that did not
punish new methods of victimization).
222. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-162, Tit. I, § 113, 119 Stat. 2960, 2987 (2006) (codified as amended in 47 U.S.C.
§ 223).
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amended the Federal Telephone Harassment Statute 223 (FTHS), which
previously only punished harassing telephone calls, 224 to include "any
device or software that can be used to originate... communications that
are transmitted ... by the Internet." 
225
Though this amendment updated the statute significantly, many types
of cyberbullying still do not fit within the purview of the statute. 226 The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted the FTHS to require the
harasser to use direct anonymous communications to place their victim in
fear.227  This interpretation not only excludes victims that know their
harasser, it also fails to punish indirect communication such as postings on
message boards or other online forums. 228 Additionally, the requirement
that the victim actually fear their harasser leaves out bullying behavior that
merely antagonizes the victim without actually threatening violence. 229
Other federal statutes, including the Interstate Communications Act (ICA)
230 and the Federal Interstate Stalking Punishment and Prevention Act
(FISPPA), 231 also contain flaws that prevent them from fully protecting
victims from cyberbullying and cyberstalking. 232
In recent years, the government has used the ICA to prosecute
cyberstalkers who have used the Internet to send threatening messages.233
The ICA makes it a crime to transmit any threat of injury to a person
through interstate commerce, 234 and at least one court has interpreted the
term "interstate commerce" to include Internet communications. 235 Still,
the ICA misses a large portion of online harassment because of its threat
223. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006).
224. Id.
225. Id. § 223(h)(1)(C).
226. See United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 382-83 (6th Cir. 2004) (describing the
elements of the Federal Telephone Harassment Statute, which requires the victim be in fear of
their harasser and that the communication be anonymous), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S.
1182 (2005).
227. Id. at 383.
228. Goodno, supra note 19, at 150.
229. See Bowker, 372 F.3d at 382-83 (requiring that the victim be in fear of their harasser to
invoke the statute).
230. 18 U.S.C. § 875 (2006).
231. Id. § 2261A.
232. See Goodno, supra note 19, at 149-52.
233. See, e.g., United States v. Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137, 1138 (10th Cir. 1999), United
States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1493 (6th Cir. 1997).
234. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2006).
235. See Kammersell, 196 F.3d at 1139 (holding that email messages that the defendant sent
to the victim in the same state were in interstate commerce because the messages traveled through
interstate phone lines).
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requirements-illustrated by United States v. Alkhabaz. 236
Alkhabaz involved the defendant posting an explicit story about the
rape of a classmate in an online chat room. 237 Though the victim felt
harassed and afraid, the court determined that the defendant had not
violated the ICA because his communications did not contain an actual
threat.238 The threat requirement means that the ICA would not apply to
many forms of cyberbullying and online harassment and is therefore
inadequate to address and prevent this conduct. 239
Just as VAWA had amended the FTHS to include language that could
be used to combat cyberstalking, it also made significant changes to the
FISPPA. 240 The new language in the FISPPA prohibits individuals who
travel in "interstate or foreign commerce" from using "any interactive
computer service" to cause "substantial emotional distress" to an
individual. 241 This language makes the FISPPA more effective than the
FTHS and the ICA because it does not require an actual threat or
242anonymous harassment. Additionally, the increased flexibility of the
"substantial emotional distress" requirement could address situations of
serious harassment that might not involve fear but still result in emotional
harm to the victim. 243 While this statute has the most promising ability to
curtail most cyberstalking and cyberbullying, the FISPPA does not address
every potential method of harassment. 244
B. Solving the Problem
There is an obvious need for a federal anti-cyberbullying statute that
could specifically address the issues raised by the unfortunate case of
245Megan Meier. However, two serious limitations exist that may prevent
236. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1496.
237. Id. at 1493.
238. Id. at 1496.
239. See id. at 1496-97 (Krupansky, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's decision to
apply the ICA only in cases where the threat is "conveyed with the general intent 'to effect some
change or achieve some goal through [intimidation]').
240. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-162, Tit. I, § 114(a), 119 Stat. 2960 (2006) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. §
2261A).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See Goodno, supra note 19, at 152 (indicating that the new statute provides separately
for "reasonable fear" and "substantial emotional distress").
244. See id. (discussing how the FISPPA does not cover instances of innocent third party
harassment such as the harasser posting sexual invitations in the victim's name).
245. If current legislation could adequately address this issue, the U.S. Attorney's Office
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the enactment of an all-encompassing statue: (1) the lack of manageable
standards and (2) the constitutional protection of free speech and other
individual liberties. 246 Thus, anyone that attempts to draft legislation to
prevent cyberbullying and other forms of online harassment needs to
remain cognizant of these limitations.247
For an online harassment prohibition to effectively protect Internet
users, especially children, it must have broad language that criminalizes
any type of harassing communications. 248 While previous statutes that
required actual threats have failed to punish clearly harassing behavior,249
others have not covered entire methods of harassment. 250 The ability of
Internet users to transmit messages through several different channels
means that legislation must be made flexible enough to cover methods of
harassment that have no real world counterpart. 25' Nonetheless, this need
for broad sweeping statutes must be balanced against the freedoms
guaranteed by the Constitution. 252
Legislation can assuage constitutional concerns by clearly defining its
scope to include only intentionally harassing conduct. 253 The First
Amendment does not protect all speech unequivocally. 254 Harassment,
defamation, threatening speech, or language that could incite violence does
not receive the same constitutional protection as political or other forms of
valuable speech. 255 Therefore, any legislation that aims to prevent cyber-
harassment should include elements that ensure specific intent to harass
would not have to resort to trying to punish Lori Drew under the CFAA. See supra Part III.
246. See Goodno, supra note 19, at 155 (suggesting that criminalizing cyberstalking could
raise precarious constitutional issues, and that the data on cyberstalking is somewhat uncertain);
Ruedy, supra note 28, at 344 (arguing that it would be difficult for a broad anti-cyberbullying law
to survive constitutional scrutiny).
247. See Goodno, supra note 19, at 155.
248. Id.
249. See United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1496 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that
criminally harassing communications must contain an actual threat).
250. See Goodno, supra note 19, at 152 (discussing how the FISPPA does not cover
instances of innocent third party harassment such as the harasser posting sexual invitations in the
victim's name).
25 1. For example, online harassers can easily and convincingly impersonate their victim so
as to cause harm- something that would be nearly impossible to do in the real world.
252. Ruedy, supra note 28, at 339.
253. Goodno, supra note 19, at 155.
254. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1063-65 (6th
ed. 2000) (discussing the lack of an absolute right to Free Speech).
255. See id. at 1060-62 (outlining the types of speech that deserve constitutional
expression); see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (establishing that speech inciting
violence does not receive constitutional protection).
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and a provision excluding constitutionally protected activity. 256
Other issues that also plague the creation of legislation that could
effectively curtail the potential rise in online harassment include the
difficulty in catching some harassers and the lack of information on the
actual level of cyber-harassment. 257 Since some harassers can employ
creative means of antagonizing their victims with complete anonymity, 
258
law enforcement officers could encounter severe impediments in executing
the laws. Additionally, a lack of data exists on the true levels of online
harassment; different jurisdictions report significantly contrasting statistics
on cyberstalking. 259 However, these discrepancies may occur because of
victims' lack of reporting and law enforcement agencies' lack of
training. 260 Regardless of the number of victims affected by online
harassment, cyberstalking and cyberbullying are serious issues that the
federal government must directly address with new legislation.
Since the Constitution prohibits ex post facto laws,26' the government
cannot use any new legislation adopted in response to Megan Meier's
suicide to charge Lori Drew. Nevertheless, federal legislators could use
this unfortunate situation as a learning experience and adopt relevant
legislation to prevent or punish future conduct similar to that found in the
262Lori Drew case. The adoption of new legislation, specifically targeted at
cyberbullying, could drastically reduce the likelihood of another tragedy
like Megan Meier's suicide.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that Lori Drew's indictment was based on an
untenable legal foundation of an almost certainly unconstitutional
extension of the CFAA, the U.S. Attorney's office obtained a
conviction. 263 This conviction means that an individual who accesses a
256. Goodno, supra note 19, at 155.
257. Id. at 156.
258. Concealing one's identity while harassing others can easily be accomplished by
creating fake email addresses, using computers at Internet cafes, etc. Even Lori Drew's true
identity might not have been discovered if she had not revealed it to a neighbor.
259. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1999 REPORT ON CYBERSTALKING: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INDUSTRY (1999),
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/cyberstalking.htm.
260. Id.
261. U.S. CONST. art. I § 9.
262. Local legislators in Megan Meier's hometown have already passed city ordinances
criminalizing cyberstalking and online harassment. See DARDENNE PRAIRIE, MO., MUNI. CODE §
210.030 (2007).
263. Tamura, supra note 11.
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website in violation of a TOS agreement can be held liable in the same
manner as Lori Drew. Lori Drew's conviction could lead to millions of
unsuspecting Americans being charged with a violation of the CFAA for
simply breaching a website's TOS agreement.
As previously discussed, many TOS agreements have unclear
language that is hidden from view and contains unsuspected terms.
Additionally, the ability of websites to dictate the law could raise serious
constitutional issues.265 Nonetheless, even if all TOS agreements used the
utmost clarity, remained visible to all users, and contained no
unconstitutional subject matter, something would still be amiss. It seems
fundamentally unfair to turn average Internet users into criminals for
completely innocuous activities such as providing inaccurate personal
information to a website. Still, this strange and improper outcome does
make sense given the extreme nature of the situation that occurred between
Lori Drew and Megan Meier.
The growth of the Internet over the last two decades coupled with the
increasing sophistication of young people continues to lead to an exorbitant
amount of kids and teenagers spending hours online every day. 266
Subsequently, social networking sites have sprung up to cater to the needs
of an Internet-generation. 267 With these sites becoming the preferred social
meeting place for young people, many social, academic, and entertainment
activities have found their way online. 268 Unfortunately, bullying has also
leapt into the digital age, and an increasing number of individuals have to
deal with harassing communications online. 269 Some schools and other
jurisdictions have responded to these developments, 270 but many remedies
fall short of solving the ultimate problems that cyberbullying and other
forms of online harassment pose to America's youth.
There are undoubtedly numerous victims of cyber-harassment, and
Megan Meier's devastating story has certainly been one of the most
publicized. 271 While the events that led Megan Meier to take her life were
264. See supra Part III.B.
265. See supra Part III.C.
266. See Alexandra Rankin Macgill, Memo: Parent and Teenager Internet Use, PEW
INTERNET, Oct. 24, 2007,
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPTeenParentsdatamemo_Oct2007.pdf.
267. See MySpace, supra note 2; see also Facebook, supra note 3.
268. Patchin & Hinduja, supra note 21, at 148.
269. I-SAFE, INC., supra note 29.
270. Ruedy, supra note 28, at 327-28.
271. See Kim Zetter, Prosecutor Will Review Megan Meier Cyberbullying Case, WIRED,
Nov. 19, 2007, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/1 l/prosecutor-will.html (describing how
Megan Meier's "story has received national attention").
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reprehensible and her family may never receive adequate redress, this lack
of justice should not lead to an unconstitutional and improper extension of
the CFAA. Nevertheless, this case may bring the shortcomings of current
anti-harassment legislation to light and convince legislators to either
modify existing laws or enact new statutes to better address the growing
trend of cyberbullying.
The motivation behind the U.S. Attorney's desire to use any means
necessary to convict Lori Drew can be easily understood given the facts of
this case. Still, the nature of the crime does not excuse the government's
improper reliance on an anti-hacking statute to penalize conduct that has
nothing to do with hacking. Not only do violations of TOS agreements fail
to fit within the statutory framework of the CFAA, but the government
attaching criminal liability to the breach of these civil contracts almost
certainly violates constitutional protections of individual liberties. 272 Lori
Drew should have to answer for her role in Megan Meier's death, but not in
a way that sacrifices civil liberties.
A positive result could still ensue from Megan Meier's tragic death.
If this unfortunate situation leads to the adoption of legislation specifically
aimed at protecting young people from online harassment, or if the
popularization of Megan's story raises awareness of the potential dangers
of cyberbullying, perhaps the potential for future stories like Megan's will
diminish. However, only time will tell.
VI. POSTSCRIPT
Added September 10, 2009
In the aftermath of Lori Drew's conviction for violating the CFAA,273
many commentators have taken the position argued in this Comment that
the conviction represents an improper usage of the CFAA and undermines
the constitutional protections that Internet users deserve. 274 Apparently,
the arguments against the conviction were sufficient to sway the opinion of
the judge who presided over Lori Drew's case, the Honorable George Wu,
U.S. District Judge for the Central District of California; in July, 2009,
272. See supra Part III.C.
273. See Tamura, supra note 11.
274. See Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy,
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2008_11_30-2008_12_06.shtml#1228319830 (Dec. 3, 2008,
09:57 PST) (describing how both The Los Angeles Times and USA Today both ran editorials
condemning Lori Drew's conviction).
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275Judge Wu announced that he would overturn the conviction. On August
28, 2009, nine months after a jury chose to convict Lori Drew,276 the
charges against her were dismissed. 277
A. Judge Wu's Final Opinion
Though the jury in Lori Drew's case entered their verdict on
November 26, 2008,278 the sentencing portion of the case was postponed
for several months while Judge Wu considered a defense motion to dismiss
the case allowed by Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c).279 Judge Wu observed that "a
motion for judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c) may be made
by a defendant seeking to challenge a conviction on the basis of the
sufficiency of the evidence,.., or on other grounds including ones
involving issues of law for the court to decide. ' 280  Here, the ultimate
question for Judge Wu to decide was whether or not an intentional
violation of a website's TOS agreement implicated the CFAA, and if so
whether the prosecution had enough evidence to establish that Lori Drew
had in fact violated the statute. 281 Though Judge Wu did not address the
evidentiary issues, he concluded that the Constitution's prohibition on
vague criminal statutes precluded the use of the CFAA to punish breaches
of TOS agreements. 282
1. The TOS and Authorized Access
Lori Drew was convicted under the provision of the CFAA that
criminalizes unauthorized access to computers; 283 this interpretation,
however, represented a great expansion of the concept of unauthorized
275. Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy,
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_06_28-2009_07_04.shtml#1246566948 (July 2, 2009,
16:35 PST).
276. See Tamura, supra note 11 (stating that Lori Drew was convicted in November of
2008).
277. See Decision on Defendant's F.R. Crim. P. 29(c) Motion at 32, United States v. Drew,
No. 08-00582 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2009) [hereinafter Drew Dismissal].
278. Tamura, supra note 11.
279. See Kim Zetter, Judge Postpones Lori Drew Sentencing, Weighs Dismissal, THREAT
LEVEL, WIRED.COM, May 18, 2009, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/05/drewsentenced/.
280. Drew Dismissal, supra note 276, at 10 (citing United States v. Freter, 31 F.3d 783, 785
(9th Cir. 1994), United States v. Pardue, 983 F.2d 843, 847 (8th Cir. 1993)).
281. Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy,
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_05_10-2009_05_16.shtml#1242229570 (May 13, 2009,
11:55 PST).
282. Drew Dismissal, supra note 276, at 32.
283. See Drew Indictment, supra note 45, at 5.
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access in terms of criminal liability. 284 Therefore, in his order dismissing
Lori Drew's conviction, Judge Wu spends substantial time addressing the
CFAA provision that criminalizes intentional access to a computer without
(or in excess of) authorization and its relationship to TOS agreements.285
"[T]he only basis for finding that Drew intentionally accessed MySpace's
computers/servers without authorization and/or in excess of authorization
was her ... violations of the [MySpace TOS] by deliberately creating the
false Josh Evans profile .... 286 Thus, if breaching a website's TOS
agreement were insufficient to satisfy the first element of the CFAA,287
then the case against Lori Drew would have to be dismissed.288 In order to
resolve this question, Jude Wu explored both the nature of TOS agreements
themselves and the undefined language of the CFAA.289
Websites specifically use TOS agreements for the purpose of defining
what conduct will and will not be acceptable on the site. 290 Moreover, it
makes sense that a website has the right to establish the extent and
conditions under which members of the public will be allowed access to its
services. 291 Thus, websites should be able to use TOS agreements to place
292limits on the level of access authorized to any given user. However,
issues may be raised as to the sufficiency of the notice and assent to the
particular terms of an agreement, and other concerns might limit
enforcement of certain restrictions. 293 Regardless, more than likely a
website's TOS agreement will be able to define the terms under which it
will allow access to its site. 294
Taking the concept of websites using their TOS agreements to define
authorized users to its logical conclusion, it appears that an individual who
uses a site contrary to its TOS would be "exceeding authorized access" to a
computer and therefore in violation of the CFAA. Simply put, the
284. See supra Part III.A.2.
285. Drew Dismissal, supra note 276, at 12-22.
286. Id. at 20.
287. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2006) ("exceeding authorized access").
288. Drew Dismissal, supra note 276, at 20.
289. See id. at 20-22.
290. Lemley, supra note 50, at 459.
291. See generally United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215, 219-21 (5th Cir. 2007); EF
Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2003); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio,
Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 245-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions,Inc.,
962 F.Supp. 1015, 1023-24 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
292. Drew Dismissal, supra note 276, at 21.
293. See id.; see also supra Part III.B (discussing the circumstances under which it would be
improper to enforce provisions ofa website's TOS agreement).
294. Drew Dismissal, supra note 276, at 21.
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language of the CFAA is very broad and unclear in its meaning, 295 thus it
could be used to criminalize several forms of everyday conduct. 296
Contrary to the fact that many commentators 297 have argued for a more
restrictive interpretation of the CFAA,298 Judge Wu decided that "[t]here is
nothing in the way that the undefined words 'authorization' and
'authorized' are used in the CFAA... which indicates that Congress
intended for them to have specialized meanings.,, 299 Therefore, Judge Wu
used the broad definition of the terms of CFAA and the principle that
websites can define authorized access through their TOS to conclude that
"an intentional breach of the [MySpace TOS] can potentially constitute
accessing the MySpace computer/Server without authorization and/or in
excess of authorization under the statute." 3 °0  Clearly, Judge Wu
determined that under the language of the CFAA, breaching a TOS
agreement could subject a website's user to liability under the statute
however the enforcement of that statute raises its own issues.
2. Void-for-Vagueness
Despite the fact that a website is free to determine the scope of access
to its services, and the CFAA criminalizes the activity of an individual who
accesses a computer without authorization, it is nonetheless
unconstitutional to enforce the CFAA against a user of a website who does
so in violation of the site's TOS. 302 This enforcement would be
unconstitutional because of the void-for-vagueness doctrine.30 3  As
discussed in Part III.C.1 of this Comment above, the void-for-vagueness
doctrine requires the government to define the activity criminalized with
sufficient clarity so as to put the public on notice and prevent arbitrary
enforcement. 3o Judge Wu concluded, just as this Comment had above,30 5
that "basing a misdemeanor CFAA violation.., upon the conscious
295. See id. at 12-20 (stepping through the key language of the CFAA provision under
which Lori Drew was convicted, namely "intentional," "access," and "without authorization").
296. See supra Part III.A.
297. Including the Author of this Comment. See supra Part III.
298. See Drew Dismissal, supra note 276, at 16-19 (describing the standards for
interpreting the language of the CFAA proffered by many scholars including Mark Lemley, Orin
Kerr and Patricia Bellia).
299. Id. at 20-21.
300. Id. at 20.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 22-32.
303. Id.; see discussion supra Part III.C. 1.
304. See supra Part III.C. 1.
305. See supra Part III.C. 1.
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violation of a website's [TOS] runs afoul of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine." 30 6 Judge Wu based his conclusion on both the "absence of
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement" and "actual notice
deficiencies." 3
0 7
a. Lack of Adequate Notice
As to the notice requirement of the void-for-vagueness doctrine,
Judge Wu observed: "the question is whether individuals of 'common
intelligence' are on notice that a breach of a [TOS] contract can become a
crime under the CFAA." 308 Ultimately, he answered this question in the
negative because of four reasons: the language of the CFAA, the lack of
definiteness as to what terms within a given TOS actually preclude
authorized access, the discretion vested in websites to determine TOS
violations, and the application of contractual terms to deciding criminal
liability. 309
First, Judge Wu inquired as to "whether the statute, as it is written,
provides sufficient notice" 3 1 0 because "the language of section
1030(a)(2)(C) does not explicitly state (nor does it implicitly suggest) that
the CFAA has 'criminalized breaches of contract' in the context of website
[TOS agreements]." 31' The court observed that breaches of contract are
not normally the basis for criminal prosecution, thus an ordinary individual
would not anticipate criminal penalties for violating a website's TOS
agreement. 312 Moreover, Judge Wu noted that "this would especially be
the case where the services provided by MySpace are in essence offered at
no cost to the users and, hence, there is no specter of the users 'defrauding'
MySpace in any monetary sense." 3 13 The ordinary Internet user could not
expect to be held criminally liable for breaching a TOS contract, and would
thus not have the requisite notice if the CFAA penalized such conduct. 3
Second, Judge Wu observed that if TOS agreements could define
authorization for purposes of CFAA liability, then the statute "would be
306. Drew Dismissal, supra note 276, at 25.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 25-28.
310. Id. at25.
311. Id.
312. Drew Dismissal, supra note 276, at 25-26; see also discussion supra Part IIl.B.1
(arguing that not only would criminal liability for breach of contract be inappropriate, but the
contracts themselves might be civilly unenforceable as well).
313. Drew Dismissal, supra note 276, at 26.
314. See id.
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unacceptably vague because it is unclear whether any or all violations of
the [TOS] will render the access unauthorized, or whether only certain ones
will." 315 As it is highly unlikely for a website's TOS to outline which
specific violations make further access unauthorized, as apposed to which
violations may have different penalties, the average user would not be on
notice as to when their authorization is terminated and criminal penalties
have arisen under the CFAA. 316 Though this issue may be solved by
attaching criminal liability to any violation of a website's TOS, this
strategy would raise another issue:
If any violation of any [TOS] is held to make the access
unauthorized, that strategy would probably resolve this
particular vagueness issue; but it would, in turn, render the
statute incredibly overbroad and contravene the second prong of
the void-for-vagueness doctrine as to setting guidelines to
govern law enforcement. 317
Because users are unaware of which breaches will subject them to criminal
liability, and which will not, the notice requirement of the void-for-
vagueness doctrine has not been met. 
318
Third, the court found that by vesting the power to define which
conduct carries criminal liability in a website owner, further vagueness
problems will arise. 319 The description of a particular term in the TOS may
be vague in and of itself, such as "unfair" or "sexually suggestive," 320 or
the scope of a provision could be decided "ad hoc and/or pursuant to
undelineated standards." 3 21 This lack of clarity fails to provide the notice
required for attaching criminal liability to these agreements, and thus using
the CFAA to punish the breach of a TOS agreement cannot withstand the
scrutiny of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. 322 Moreover, Judge Wu stated
that some TOS agreements may allow for unilateral amendment or
modification of their terms without notice to users-further leading to a
lack of notice as to prohibited conduct. 323
Fourth, Judge Wu noted that because TOS agreements are "essentially
315. Id.
316. See id.
317. Id. at 26-27 (emphasis in original).
318. See id.
319. Drew Dismissal, supra note 276, at 27.
320. Id. (citing specific examples of unclear terms from the MySpace TOS agreement).
321. Id. (illustrating how the MySpace TOS "provides that what constitutes 'prohibited
content' on the website is determined 'in the sole discretion of MySpace.com"').
322. See id.
323. Id.
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a contractual means for setting the scope of authorized access," 324 the
application of specific terms or contract law in general may lead to
improper vagueness. 325 For example, the MySpace TOS requires that a
dispute arising under the agreement be settled through arbitration; this
could mean that criminal liability may not be settled until after the
completion of the arbitration.326 Moreover, the general principles of the
relevant contract law may set out remedies for nonperformance of a TOS
agreement other than termination of the contract. 327 The contract itself
could also specify particular remedies. 328 Therefore, a breach of the
agreement may not in all circumstances lead to the user accessing the site
outside the scope of authorization-this creates a situation of impermissible
uncertainty when criminal liability is attached to the agreement through the
CFAA.329
b. Insufficient Standards for Enforcement
In addition to the insufficient notice provided to average Internet
users, Judge Wu also recognized that a CFAA that criminalizes breaches of
TOS agreements would fail to provide adequate guidelines to govern
enforcement of the law. 330 The court corroborated the argument proffered
by this Comment when it stated: "Treating a violation of a website's
[TOS], without more, to be sufficient to constitute 'intentionally
access[ing] a computer without authorization or exceed[ing] authorized
access' would result in transforming [the CFAA] into an overwhelmingly
overbroad enactment that would convert... innocent Internet users into...
criminals." 33' Given the potentially broad scope of a CFAA that
criminalized violations of TOS agreements, Judge Wu "question[ed] as to
whether Congress has 'establish[ed] minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement."' 332 Because he felt that the required guidelines were not
present, Judge Wu determined that law enforcement would have far too
324. Id.
325. Drew Dismissal, supra note 276, at 27.
326. See id. at 27-28.
327. See id. at 28 (describing how under California law the remedies of breach of contract
include damages, declaratory relief, rescission and restitution, specific performance, and
injunction among others).
328. Id.
329. See id.; supra Part III.C.I.
330. Drew Dismissal, supra note 276, at 29.
331. Id.; see also supra Part III.C. 1.
332. Drew Dismissal, supra note 276, at 29 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,
358 (1983)).
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much discretion and consequently the statute would be unconstitutionally
333vague.
In an effort to overcome the challenge of unconstitutional vagueness,
the government suggested a scienter requirement existed in the CFAA
provision that punished "intentional" access of a computer without
authorization.334 In the government's view, because conviction under the
CFAA requires proving malicious intent on behalf of the perpetrator, the
statute is not vague and provides sufficient guidelines to direct law
enforcement as to when to charge individuals with violation. 33 The
argument is essentially that law enforcement will only charge individuals
whom they can prove had the requisite intent, therefore the statute is
precise as to which individuals deserve prosecution, and which do not. 336
Nonetheless, Judge Wu rejected this interpretation of the statute: "The
only scienter element in section 1030(a)(2)(C) is the requirement that the
person must 'intentionally' access a computer without authorization or
'intentionally' exceed authorized access." 337 Moreover, the government's
position that "the 'intentional' requirement is met simply by a conscious
violation of a website's [TOS] ... basically eliminates any limiting and/or
guiding effect of the scienter element." 3 38 In an attempt to broaden the
CFAA to prosecute Lori Drew, the government in effect destroyed any
argument that it could have made in relation to the statute providing
guidance to law enforcement.
Judge Wu also recognized that because any breach of a TOS
agreement could garner prosecution, the statute would provide the
government with free reign to prosecute some offenders and not others. 340
"[I]f every such breach does qualify [as a CFAA violation], then there is
absolutely no limitation or criteria as to which of the breaches should merit
criminal prosecution."' 341  Therefore, a large. cross-section of conduct
prohibited in a TOS agreement 342 could be prosecuted under the CFAA,
from posting child-pornography to uploading pictures of friends without
333. Id. at 29-31.
334. Id. at 30.
335. See id.
336. See id.
337. Id. at 31.
338. Drew Dismissal, supra note 276, at 31.
339. See id.
340. Id. at 31-32.
341. Id. at 31.
342. See supra Part III.B (discussing certain types of conduct prohibited in various TOS
agreements).
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permission. 141 "Given the 'standardless sweep' that results, federal law
enforcement entities would be improperly free 'to pursue their personal
predilictions."' 344 The vesting of complete discretion in law enforcement
whether or not to prosecute is precisely the type of outcome the void-for-
vagueness doctrine aims to prevent 345-this combined with the lack of
notice to Internet users as to what conduct would actually be treated as
criminal caused the court to grant the defense Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)
motion and dismiss the charges against Lori Drew. 346
B. Where Do We Go From Here?
More than three years after Megan Meier's death 347 and even now
that Lori Drew's conviction has been overturned, the state of the law as it
relates to cyberbullying is no clearer than it was before. 348 Though one
court has decided it would be improper to extend the CFAA to punish
violations of website TOS agreements, all federal law enforcement offices
are not bound by the ruling. 349 Moreover, because Judge Wu dismissed
this case because a lack of required definiteness, the government could
overcome this hurdle by changing the language of the CFAA or adopting
provisions for standardized TOS verbiage that would be sufficient to guide
law enforcement and put citizens on notice.
It is clear from the saga of Lori Drew that serious limitations exist in
the current state of laws that could be used to protect children from and
punish cyberbullying. 350 Additionally, the scope of the relationship
between TOS agreements and the CFAA can extend to other situations as
well. 351 In circumstances where a broad reading of the CFAA can lead to
343. Drew Dismissal, supra note 276, at 31
344. Id. at 31-32 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)).
345. Id. at 32.
346. Id.
347. See Kim Zetter, Judge Acquits Lori Drew in Cyberbullying Case, Overrules Jury,
THREAT LEVEL, WIRED.COM, July 2, 2009,
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/07/drewcourt.
348. See Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy,
http://volokh.com/posts/1241740320.shtm (May 7, 2009, 19:52 PST) (discussing the problems
with proposed legislation aimed at criminalizing cyberbullying).
349. As this was merely the opinion of a district court, the decision is not binding precedent
on any courts in other jurisdictions.
350. See supra Part IV (discussing the ineffectiveness of current laws to protect children
from harassment online).
351. See Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy,
http://volokh.com/archives/archive20090222-20090228.shbtml#1235510297 (Feb. 25, 2009,
01:03 PST) (discussing United States v. Nosal, a federal case in California using the a broad
reading of the CFAA to bring criminal charges on a former employee of a company who accessed
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criminal liability for noncompliance with vague contractual terms, the
Judge Wu's holding in this case may be whittled away over time.
Eventually, the state of the law could be right back to where it was before
Judge Wu dismissed Lori Drew's case, and more unknowing website users
could be haled in front of federal criminal courts.
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